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Abstract: We explore the relationship between willingness to take financial risk and the probability of taking 
out a loan for educational purposes as well as the influence of risk attitudes on the size of the loan using data 
drawn from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. The findings suggest a positive relationship between 
individuals’ willingness to take financial risk and the probability of taking out a loan for educational purposes. 
Similarly, individuals’ willingness to take financial risk appears to be an important determinant of the size of the 
educational loan. The findings suggest that non-white individuals and individuals from less wealthy 
backgrounds are less likely to finance education through loans which could potentially increase inequalities in 
education and income if such individuals are deterred from investing in human capital. 
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I. Introduction and background 
 
Over the last forty years, in a range of countries there has been an increase in the number of 
individuals attending post-secondary school education and, in particular, attending university 
(e.g. the UK, France, Italy and Spain). For example, according to Greenaway and Haynes 
(2007), the number of students attending university in the UK has increased from 400,000 in 
the early 1960’s to more than 2 million in 2000. At the same time, some OECD countries 
such as Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the U.S. have moved away from providing 
public higher education towards private higher education by increasing university fees.1  
The U.S. was one of the first countries to move away from public provision of higher 
education by increasing the enrollment fees to attend university. In 1992, the Higher 
Education Reauthorization Act created the Stafford Unsubsidized loan program in the U.S., 
which gave access to educational loans to all students regardless of their economic 
background.2 This Act created a new possibility for the financial markets in the U.S. to 
increase the rate of educational loans taken out. To be specific, before 1992, the Federal 
Stafford loan program for education offered a subsidized loan for those students with 
financial needs (i.e. low income families). Since 1992, those students without financial needs 
were entitled to apply to the unsubsidized loan program. Both types of loans have similar 
terms and conditions, but the subsidized loan only applies interest repayments once the 
student graduates from university. At the same time, banks and financial institutions started 
to offer private educational loans with similar terms and conditions to those offered by the 
unsubsidized Stafford loan.  
Chapman (2006) reviews the international reform of higher education provision and 
argues that, in general, student loans do not offer total protection to borrowers and, in 
                                                 
1
 According to Canton and Blom (2004), this may be due to the recent increase in international labour mobility 
making it less attractive for governments to invest in higher education if future benefits to education are to be 
received by other countries. 
2
 From 1965 to 1992, access to educational loans was subsidized and restricted to students from low income 
families. 
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particular, to those borrowers who are not as successful in the labour market as expected and 
who receive low levels of income. In a similar vein, Chapman and Ryan (2005) study the 
effects of the introduction of income contingent loans in Australia.3 They conclude that 
higher education participation increased for individuals from middle income families and for 
females, but there was no change in the participation rate of individuals from low income 
families. More recently, Chapman and Sinning (2011) use data from the German 
Microcensus to explore the effects of a hypothetical income contingent loan system in 
Germany. They conclude that income contingent loans would be financially feasible even for 
low income graduates. 
Most of the existing studies in this area have focused on the effects of replacing grants 
with loans for education. For example, Swarthout (2006) analyses U.S. survey data to explore 
whether student loans of large amounts influence students’ future occupations. He concludes 
that taking out a loan for education could influence the career choice of the students. 
Similarly, Minicozzi (2005) using U.S. data shows how educational debt affects job 
decisions, making students more likely to choose jobs with initially high wages but with 
lower wage growth.  
In this paper, in contrast to much of the existing literature, we focus on the 
determinants, rather than the implications, of taking out a loan for educational purposes. We 
focus on one particular influence on the decision to take out such a loan, namely attitudes 
towards risk. It is apparent that increasing fees for higher education can have important 
consequences for students and their families as this could increase the financial pressures 
associated with attending university and, hence, risk aversion may play an important role in 
the decision to attend university (Greenway and Haynes, 2007).  Furthermore, individuals 
belonging to wealthy families may find it easier to pay university fees than students from less 
                                                 
3
 Educational loans can be classified into two groups according to the repayment method: mortgage type loans 
and income contingent loans. Mortgage type loans offer a fixed repayment over a set time period while income 
contingent loans offer a repayment system which varies according to the individual’s future income. 
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wealthy families, which could increase future educational and wage inequalities. In order to 
reduce potential inequalities in access to university, income contingent loans are designed to 
facilitate access to higher education for everyone, offering a repayment system, which varies 
according to the individual’s future income. However, some individuals are more willing than 
others to take financial risks and this could be an important barrier when deciding to take out 
a loan to finance investment in university education. Taking out a loan for education involves 
risk since individuals are uncertain about whether they will be able to meet the future 
payments as well as being uncertain about their aptitude for studying at university. For this 
reason, understanding how risk attitudes affect the decision of whether to take out a loan for 
education represents an important contribution to the economics of education literature as 
well as being of potential interest to policy-makers. 
The shortage of literature in this area is somewhat surprising although one possible 
explanation could relate to the difficulty of finding a suitable measure of risk attitudes. One 
exception is Eckel et al. (2007) who explore the relationship between debt aversion and 
educational loans using experimental techniques. They analyse the role of individuals’ 
attitudes towards debt when deciding to take out a loan for post-secondary education in 
Canada. The findings suggest that debt aversion is not a barrier to taking out loans for 
education; however, those individuals who have had any previous experience with debt (i.e. 
debt use) are found to be more likely to take out an educational loan.4 Barr and Crawford 
(1998) argue that it is important to understand whether debt averse individuals are the group 
most affected by ‘high’ university fees, which could make investment in human capital even 
more difficult for them. A lack of information could be another important negative factor 
when deciding to take out a loan for education. Booij et al. (2008) develop an experiment 
                                                 
4
 The variable debt aversion includes questions designed to measure the person’s attitude towards borrowing 
such as whether the individuals have credit cards and whether the individuals would borrow from a financial 
institution or from credit cards for unexpected expenditure. Debt use is measured by whether the individual has 
ever been behind in a bill, loan, rent or mortgage repayment, whether the individual has ever sold an asset to pay 
a debt and whether the individual’s spending is larger than the individual’s income. 
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with Dutch students in order to understand whether having better information about 
educational loans increases the number of students taking out a loan to attend university. 
Using an instrumental variable approach, they find that improving information about the 
conditions of educational loans, such as the interest rate and the repayment period, does not 
have any impact on the take-up rate.5  
The aim of the empirical analysis presented in this paper is to explore the relationship 
between individuals’ willingness to take financial risks and the probability of taking out an 
educational loan as well as the size of the loan using data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances. The results will help us to understand whether risk averse individuals are less 
willing to take out a loan for educational purposes than less risk averse individuals, which 
may increase their probability of having lower levels of educational attainment and, hence, 
potentially influences their future labour market outcomes. Indeed, our empirical findings 
suggest that willingness to take financial risks is positively associated with the probability of 
taking out a loan for educational purposes as well as the size of the loan. 
III. Data 
We analyse the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) developed by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board since 1983. This cross-section survey contains detailed information about the 
balance sheet, pension, income, demographic characteristics and the use of financial 
institutions by U.S. families. To be specific, the SCF contains questions related to educational 
loans. In the 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 cross-section surveys, the head of the 
household was asked the following questions: Not counting credit cards or loans you may 
have told us about, do you have any loan for educational expenses? If so, how much was 
                                                 
5
 Similarly, Oosterbeek and Broek (2009) use data from the same survey among Dutch students to analyse the 
low take-up rate of student loans in the Netherlands. They conclude that factors such as the subjective discount 
rate, earnings prospects and students’ risk attitudes have limited explanatory power in explaining the low take-
up rate of student loans in the Netherlands. 
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borrowed not counting the finance charges?6 The responses to these questions yield detailed 
information not only about whether the individual has taken out a loan to finance education 
but also about the size of the loan.  
The SCF also contains the following question related to individual’s willingness to 
take financial risk which is answered by the head of household:  which of the following 
statements comes closest to describing the amount of financial risk that you are willing to 
take when you save or make investments? Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn 
substantial returns; Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average 
returns; Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns; Or not willing to 
take any financial risks.7 
We use the responses to this question to create a three point risk attitudes index as 
follows: 







=
returns bstantialaverage/su above   
23.96% for        risks finanacial bstantialaverage/su above  take to willingare they if  2
47.76%              returns averagefor  risks financial average  take to willingare they if  1
28.28%                                            risks financialany   take tognot willin are they if  0
ir  
Thus, the index is increasing in willingness to take financial risk such that if the individual, i, 
is not willing to take any financial risk, the risk attitudes index takes the value of zero, whilst 
if the individual is willing to take above average financial risk for above average returns or is 
willing to take substantial financial risk for substantial returns, the risk attitudes index takes 
the highest value of 2.8 
Therefore, we exploit the responses to these questions in order to explore the 
relationship between the probability of taking out an educational loan and the individual’s 
                                                 
6
 Unfortunately, the SCF data set does not provide information about the type of loan (i.e. federal or private 
loan) or the conditions of the loan. 
7
 This measure of risk attitudes has been used extensively in the economics literature. See, for example, Shaw 
(1996), Schooley and Worden (1996), Grabble and Lytton (2001), Finke and Huston (2003) and Hanna and 
Lindamood (2004). 
8
 Due to the small sample size we collapse the top two categories by creating a three point risk aversion index 
taking ‘not willing to take any financial risk’ as the base category. 
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willingness to take financial risk, as well as the relationship between the amount borrowed 
for educational expenses and willingness to take financial risk. The sample is restricted to 
those individuals who are in higher education aged between 18 and 65 years old, yielding a 
total of 1,740 observations.9 Given the nature of the data, reverse causality may be a potential 
problem related to the analysis. Attitudes towards risk may be associated with factors such as 
education, income and wealth. To reduce the potential for reverse causality, we restrict the 
sample to those individuals who are currently in higher education as we are interested in the 
relationship between individuals’ willingness to take financial risk and the probability of 
taking out an educational loan before the completion of the investment in education takes 
place, as completion of the investment could potentially influence individuals’ willingness to 
take financial risk.10 
IV. Attitudes towards Risk and the Probability of taking out a Loan for Education 
Methodology 
We explore the relationship between the probability of taking out a loan for education, which 
is measured by a dummy variable,11 and the individual’s willingness to take financial risk 
with a probit model as follows: 
iiii xLoan εβ +=* , ( )1,0~ Niε                                                                                                 (1) 
where *iLoan
 
denotes the latent variable for the propensity to take out a loan for education, 
ix  represents a set of explanatory variables and iε  denotes the error term, which is normally 
distributed. To be specific, ix  includes the risk attitudes index, ir , and socio-demographic 
                                                 
9
 It is apparent from the question that it could be the case that individuals took out a loan for the education of 
their children or even spouse rather than for their own education. In this case, however, we would argue that the 
analysis still provides information on the relationship between incurring debt for educational purposes and 
attitudes towards risk. 
10
 In the SCF survey, the question relating to educational loans is placed before the risk attitudes question. 
Therefore, it is important to highlight the potential limitations of the variables and potential issues of reverse 
causality. For example, some individuals could indicate that they are willing to take financial risk as self-
justification for having taken out a loan for education. 
11
 The loan variable takes the value of 1 if the individual has a loan (805 observations) and takes the value of 0 if 
the individual does not have a loan (935 observations). 
 8 
characteristics such as age, male, white, married, the number of children of the respondent 
and household size. Unfortunately, the SCF data set does not include detailed information 
about family background, such as the educational attainment or occupation of the individual’s 
parents, however, we try to capture the possible effects of family background by including in 
the set of controls the natural logarithm of the total net wealth of the household.12 We also 
include in the set of controls whether the respondent (i.e. the student) is working and year 
dummy variables. Table 1 in the Appendix presents summary statistics of the key variables 
employed in our econometric analysis.13 
Following Greene (2003), we model the probability of taking out a loan for education 
with a probit model where the probability of observing 1=Loan  is given by: 
)()()0()0()1( ββεεβ iiiiiii xxPxPLoanPLoanP Φ=−>=>+=>==                            (2) 
Results  
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the marginal effects from the probit analysis of the probability of 
taking out a loan for education. Our findings in Table 2 suggest that willingness to take 
financial risk is positively related to the probability of taking out a loan for education. As a 
result of a one-unit increase in the risk aversion index, the probability of taking out a loan for 
education is increased by around 5.5 percentage points.14 Similarly, being male, white or 
married are all positively related to the probability of taking out a loan for education. Males 
have a 9 percentage points higher probability of taking out a loan for education than females; 
white individuals have a 10 percentage points higher probability of taking out a loan for 
education than non-white individuals; and married individuals have an 8 percentage points 
higher probability of taking out a loan for education than individuals who are not married. 
                                                 
12
 Total net wealth of the household includes: the value of land, buildings, farms or ranches owned by the 
household; the value of houses, holiday houses or other properties; net worth of businesses owned by any 
member of the household; the value of owned cars and other vehicles; financial assets and inheritances; net of 
mortgage and loans (excluding loans for educational purposes).  
13
 All monetary variables have been deflated to 2004 prices. 
14
 This is evaluated at the mean of the risk attitudes index for the sample. 
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Age is also an important determinant of the probability of taking out an educational loan. The 
older the individual is, the higher is the probability of taking out a loan for education. In order 
to capture any possible non linear effect, we also include age squared in the set of controls. 
The results confirm that older individuals have higher probabilities of taking out a loan for 
education than younger individuals and the non linear effect is very small.15 
We also include net household wealth in our analysis to try to capture the effects of 
family background on the probability of taking out a loan for education. The results show that 
the effect of total net wealth is statistically significant and negatively related to the 
probability of taking out a loan for education, indicating that students belonging to a wealthy 
household are less likely to take out an educational loan. Finally, if a student is working, 
he/she has around a 4 percentage point higher probability of taking out an educational loan 
than a student who is not working.16  
In Panel B of Table 2, due to the fact that the intervals of potential income loss 
specified in the hypothetical gambles at 10%, 20%, 33%, 50% and 75% are somewhat 
irregular, we repeat the probit analysis replacing the risk attitudes index with a set of dummy 
variables. The results show that individuals who are willing to take average financial risk for 
average financial returns have a 17 percentage points higher probability of taking out a loan 
for education than individuals who are not willing to take any financial risk. Similarly, those 
individuals who are willing to take above average/substantial risk for above 
average/substantial returns have a 10 percentage points higher probability of taking out an 
educational loan than those who are not willing to take any financial risk. 
The small size of the sample used in our analysis does not allow us to split the sample 
by gender in order to explore gender differences in the effect of risk attitudes on the 
                                                 
15
 Although the results might be contrary to human capital theory, it is important to acknowledge that, as 
previously stated, it could be the case that individuals have taken out an educational loan for their children rather 
than for their own education. 
16
 The marginal effect on the risk aversion index does not change significantly if total wealth and the control for 
whether the student is working or not are omitted. 
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probability of taking out a loan for education. To overcome this issue, we introduce an 
interaction term between the risk attitudes index and the male dummy variable. Table 3 
presents the results of the probit model after including an interaction term, ir Male× .
17
 The 
differential effect for a male who is willing to take average financial risk for average returns 
is around 58 percentage points (Table 3 Panel B).18 Similarly, the differential effect for a 
male who is willing to take above average/substantial financial risk for above 
average/substantial financial returns is around 55 percentage points.19 
Similarly, in Table 3 (Panels C and D) we introduce an additional term which 
interacts the risk aversion index with a dummy variable which denotes 25 years old or 
younger. By including this additional term, we aim to explore whether willingness to take 
financial risk at different ages affects the probability of taking out a loan for education. We 
focus on those individuals who are 25 years old or younger as the average age at which 
individuals finish the Bachelors degree in the U.S. is 25 years old (Tulip, 2007). Our findings 
show that the effect of the interaction term between being 25 years old or younger and the 
risk attitudes index is statistically insignificant. After replacing ( 25)ir Age× ≤  with the 
interaction term between being 25 years old or younger and the risk attitudes dummy 
variables, we find a positive and statistically significant effect suggesting that a differential 
risk attitudes effect exists on the probability of taking out a loan for education across the 
different age groups (Table 3 Panel D). 
V. Attitudes towards Risk and the Amount of the Loan  
 
Methodology 
Our second aim is to explore the relationship between the individual’s willingness to take 
financial risk and the amount of the loan taken out. This could be particularly interesting as it 
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 The marginal effects of the interaction terms in Table 3 have been estimated following Ai and Norton (2003). 
18
 The results relating to the previous set of controls are robust to the inclusion of the interaction term. 
19
 According to Ai and Norton (2003), page 126, ‘the statistical significance of the interaction effect is often 
stronger when the interaction effect is positive than when negative, with t-statistics as high as ten.’ 
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is important to understand whether individuals are willing to take out a loan, which, for 
example, covers all the expenses of their educational investment (fees and living expenses) or 
whether they are just willing to take out a loan to cover their fees only. According to Tulip 
(2007), the average total tuition fee in 2003 in a U.S. university was $8,700,20 and the 
average amount of living expenses during the university period was around $40,000.21 He 
argues that the financial constraints of students are given by the attendance fees and the living 
expenses.  
In our analysis, the dependent variable is characterised by the presence of a high 
proportion of observations with the value zero (see Figure 1 in Appendix).22 According to 
Tobin (1958), the tobit model allows for the consideration of all the observations in the 
sample, including those that are censored at zero. Therefore, following Wooldridge (2002), 
we model the relationship between the amount of the loan taken out and the risk attitudes 
index with a tobit model as follows: 
iii xl εβ +=* , ),0(~ 2σε Ni                                                                                                     (3) 




>+=
≤
=
0  if         
0  if                             0
**
*
iiiii
i
i lxl
l
l
µβ                                                                                            (4) 
where *il is the latent variable, which represents the natural logarithm of the amount of the 
loan, and il  is the actual observed amount of the loan. Since the distribution of the amount of 
the loan is highly skewed, following Brown et al. (2008), we specify a logarithmic dependent 
variable. Note that for students reporting a zero amount for the loan, )ln( ll is recoded to zero 
as there is no reported amount of the loan between zero and the unity.  ix   represents the set 
of individual characteristics that explain both the probability of taking out a loan for 
                                                 
20
 According to Tulip (2007), the fees for a private university in the U.S. in 2003 are around $22,000 per year.  
21
 This includes the accommodation, transport, books, supplies and miscellaneous expenses. 
22
 The average size of the loan for those individuals who took out a loan for education is around $11,000. 
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education and the amount of the loan.23 The vector of parameters to be estimated is 
represented by β  and iε  represents the normally and homoskedatic distributed error term. 
Results 
 
The second column of Tables 2 and 3 presents the results of modeling the amount of the loan 
for education. The results in Table 2 show that willingness to take financial risk is positively 
related to the size of the educational loan. Similarly, being white and age both have a positive 
and statistically significant relationship with the amount of the educational loan. The number 
of children and the number of household members both appear to be statistically 
insignificantly related to the amount of the loan for education while the number of household 
members is negatively related to the amount of the loan taken out. Married individuals have, 
on average, much larger loans than non married individuals. The results suggest that the 
relationship between household wealth and the amount of the loan for education is 
statistically insignificant. In Panel B in Table 2, we replace the risk attitudes index with a set 
of dummy variables. The results confirm the positive and statistically significant relationship 
between willingness to take financial risk and the size of the loan taken out. 
 After introducing the risk attitudes-male interaction term (see Table 3), the results 
show that the effect of being male is still positive and statistically significant suggesting that 
males have larger loans for education. Similarly, the results relating to the risk attitudes index 
indicate that willingness to take financial risk is positively associated with the size of 
educational loans. However, the interaction term between risk attitudes and being male is 
negative and statistically significant. In Panel B of Table 3, we replace the risk attitudes index 
with a set of dummy variables and we find that the differential effect for a male, who is 
willing to take average financial risk for average financial return, is positive and statistically 
significant for the amount of the loan taken. Similarly, the differential effect of a male who is 
                                                 
23
 This set of characteristics is the same as that used to explain the probability of taking out a loan for education 
in Section IV. 
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willing to take above average/substantial financial risk for above average/substantial financial 
returns, is positive and statistically significant for the amount of the educational loan take out. 
 As with the probit analysis, we then explore the determinants of the size of the loan 
for education including an interaction term between risk attitudes and a dummy variable 
denoting 25 years old or younger (see Table 3 Panel C). After including this interaction term, 
the results relating to the other control variables do not change with respect to our previous 
results. However, whether the student is 25 years old or younger appears to have a 
statistically insignificant influence on the size of the loan for education. The analysis in Panel 
D in Table 3 explores the robustness of the results when we replace the risk attitudes index 
with the set of dummy variables. Our findings show that the interaction terms between being 
25 years old or younger and the risk attitudes dummy variables have a statistically significant 
effect on the probability of taking out a loan for education for those individuals who are 
willing to take average financial risk only. 24 
VI. Robustness 
 
Methodology 
One shortcoming of the tobit model is that it does not allow for the nature of the zero 
observations assuming that the observations are zero due to other factors rather than the non 
participation decision of the respondents. Hence, in order to explore the robustness of the 
findings, we explore a double hurdle specification. According to Cragg (1971), the double 
hurdle model relaxes this assumption of the tobit model by giving special treatment to the 
participation decision. The double hurdle model assumes two hurdles in order to observe 
positive values, each of them is determined by a different set of independent variables. The 
first hurdle refers to participation and the second one refers to the intensity of use after 
overcoming mis-reporting or data problems. Given such characteristics, the double hurdle 
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 It is apparent that the results for 1r =  and 2r = are not monotonic. This could be due to the large proportion 
of individuals in the 1r =  category (almost 50 per cent). 
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model has been widely used in the literature to study consumer demand models (see for 
example Jones, 1992, Yen and Jones, 1997 and Aristei et al., 2008), labour supply models 
(Blundell and Meghir, 1987) and loan default analysis (Moffatt, 2005). Cragg (1971) 
develops the double hurdle model by modifying the tobit model in the following way, where 
loan denotes whether or not the individual reported having a loan for educational purposes: 


 >=
=
 otherwise   0
0  and  1 if  ** ii
i
lloanll
                                                                                               (5) 
where *il  is the latent variable, which represents the natural logarithm of the amount of the 
loan, and il  is the actual observed amount of the loan. il  takes value zero when there is 
censoring at zero or due to random circumstances.25 Jones (1992) rewrites equation (5) 
showing the process involved in observing zero values: 








<+≤+
>+≤+
≤+>+
=
>+>+>+==
0  and  0
0  and  0
0  and  0
  if  0
0  and  0  if  0
2211
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221122
*
iiii
iiii
iiii
i
iiiiiiii
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uxvx
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uxvx
l
or
uxvxuxll
ββ
ββ
ββ
βββ
    (6)                                 
where 1x  and 2x are two different sets of variables for the first (i.e. participation) and second 
(i.e. intensity) hurdles. Both sets of variables include individuals’ socio-economic 
characteristics as previously described in Section IV. However, the set of controls defining 
the participation equation (i.e. the first hurdle) includes an additional variable, which 
                                                 
25
 On the contrary, Heckman’s model (1979) assumes that all the zeros are due to the decision of non 
participation of the respondents, which would not be appropriate for our purposes as it could be that some 
students did not get a loan even if they applied for it. However, we also model the probability of taking out a 
loan and the amount of the loan with a Heckman model. The results are consistent with the analysis, suggesting 
a positive relationship between the risk attitudes index and both the probability of taking out a loan for 
education and the amount of the loan. These results are available on request. 
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indicates whether the individual has been turned down for a loan in the last five years.26 
Hence, a positive amount of the loan is observed only if an individual takes out a loan for 
education. 
Results  
 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results from the double hurdle analysis under the assumption of 
dependent errors (see, Jones 1992).27 In other words, we assume there is a relationship 
between the errors of the participation equation and the errors of the intensity equation. The 
results in Table 4 suggest that being willing to take financial risk, white, age and male all 
have a positive and statistically significant relationship with the decision of taking out a loan 
for education and the amount of the loan taken out. In accordance with the previous results, 
being married only has a positive effect on the probability of taking out an educational loan. 
The number of children in the household, as well as household size, have negative and 
statistically significant effects in the case of the size of the loan. Household wealth has a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with the decision of taking out a loan for 
education but a positive effect in the case of the size of the loan. This finding suggests that 
when the individual belongs to a wealthy household they have a lower probability of taking 
out a loan for education because they may have sufficient financial assets to finance their 
education, but when they decide to take out a loan for education, they may be able to obtain 
larger loans. Clearly, over time relative to 1992 both participation and the amount of the loan 
have increased. In Panel B in Table 4, we replace the risk attitudes index ( ir ) with the set of 
dummy variables. In this case, being willing to take average financial risk has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the first decision (i.e. taking out a loan for education). On the 
                                                 
26
 Unfortunately, the SCF data set does not provide information about the reason for which the loan has been 
turned down or what type of loan it was. The validity of the instrument has been checked, where the instrument 
is statistically significant in modelling the probability of taking out a loan but statistically insignificant when 
modeling the size of the loan. 
27
 Tables 4 and 5 show that the correlation terms ( )ρ
 
between iu  and iv  are statistically significant. This 
suggests that the error terms of the two equations that form the double hurdle model are correlated. 
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contrary, being willing to take above average/substantial financial risk has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on both the participation decision and the amount of the loan. 
 Table 5 presents the results after including the interaction term, ir Male× . The results 
are robust to its inclusion suggesting that willingness to take financial risk has a statistically 
significant positive effect in both decision stages. The interaction term between the risk 
attitudes index and the male dummy variable has a statistically significant negative effect on 
the decision to take out a loan for education yet a positive effect in the case of the size of the 
loan.  
 Table 5 Panel C presents the results after including the interaction term between the 
risk attitudes index and the dummy variable for 25 years old or younger, i.e. ( 25)ir Age× ≤ . 
Whether the individual is 25 years old or younger has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the size of the loan. The risk attitudes index has a statistically significant positive 
effect on the participation decision only. However, the combined effect of ( 25)ir Age× ≤  is 
only positive and statistically significant in the case of the amount of the loan for education. 
This suggests that individuals aged 25 years old or younger, who are willing to take financial 
risk and who decided to take out a loan for education, have larger educational loans.  
VII. Conclusions 
 
We have explored the relationship between attitudes towards risk and the probability of 
taking out a loan for education as well as the size of the loan using a representative data set 
from the U.S., based on pooling five cross-sections of the SCF. To be specific, we have 
explored the relationship between the probability of taking out a loan to finance education 
and individuals’ economic and demographic characteristics, including attitudes towards 
financial risk. We have also explored how the size of the loan for education varies with socio-
economic characteristics and the risk attitudes of the individuals.  
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We find that willingness to take financial risk is positively related to the probability of 
taking out a loan for education and with the size of the loan. Similarly, our results suggest 
that characteristics such as age, male, white and married are all positively related to both the 
probability of taking out a loan and the size of the educational loan. The results also suggest 
that household size and household wealth are negatively related to the probability of taking 
out a loan for education and its size.  
 Our empirical analysis contributes to the existing literature by helping us to 
understand whether differences in risk attitudes could lead to inequalities in education. Our 
results suggest that differences in attitudes towards financial risk may affect investment in 
higher education by influencing the decision to take out a loan, which can ultimately lead to 
inequalities in labour income and wealth. In addition, the results suggest that non-white 
individuals and individuals from less wealthy households are less likely to finance higher 
education through loans. If risk aversion is concentrated among low socio-economic groups, 
then our findings predict that individuals from poorer backgrounds will be unlikely to invest 
in their human capital thereby increasing potentially inequalities in education and income as 
well as inequalities in the next generation. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Histogram of the Amount of the Loan (sample = individuals who have a loan). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the SCF data set (Sample = Current Student Head of 
Household) 
 
  
ALL STUDENTS 
 
STUDENTS WITH LOAN 
 MEAN STDEV MAX MIN MEAN STDEV MAX MIN 
Having a Loan 0.462 0.498 1 0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
Log Amount of Loan 4.276 4.486 11.751 0 
 
8.861 
 
1.029 
 
11.082 
 
4.605 
Age 28.685 8.971 65 18 
 
28.099 
 
7.952 
 
65 
 
18 
Age Squared 903.278 625.567 4225 324 
 
85.732 
 
554.99 
 
4225 
 
324 
Age≤ 25 0.462 0.498 1 0 
 
0.459 
 
0.498 
 
1 
 
0 
White 0.680 0.466 1 0 
 
0.737 
 
0.440 
 
1 
 
0 
Male 0.540 0.498 1 0 
 
0.614 
 
0.486 
 
1 
 
0 
Number of Children 0.352 0.929 6 0 
 
0.304 
 
0.804 
 
4 
 
0 
Married 0.244 0.429 1 0 
 
0.291 
 
0.454 
 
1 
 
0 
Household Size 2.471 1.378 9 1 
 
2.403 
 
1.390 
 
9 
 
1 
Risk Attitudes Index() 0.956 0.721 2 0 
 
1.037 
 
0.669 
 
2 
 
0 
ir Male×  0.582 0.740 2 0 
 
0.674 
 
0.719 
 
2 
 
0 
( 25)ir Age× ≤  0.463 0.701 2 0 
 
0.481 
 
0.697 
 
2 
 
0 
Log of Household Wealth 7.496 4.630 18.006 -11.435 
 
7.414 
 
4.445 
 
12.977 
 
-11.435 
Student Working 0.471 0.499 1 0 
 
0.527 
 
0.499 
 
1 
 
0 
Turned Down for a Loan 0.270 0.444 1 0 
 
0.285 
 
0.452 
 
1 
 
0 
Observations 
 
1,740 
 
805 
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Table 2:  The Determinants of the Probability of Having a Loan for Education and Size of 
the Educational Loan. 
 
 Probability of Having a Loan Size of the Loan 
 ME tstat ME tstat 
Panel A: Risk Attitudes Index 
Age 0.023 (2.75) 0.024 (2.87) 
Age Squared -0.000 (3.30) -0.000 (3.47) 
White 0.102 (3.84) 0.105 (3.99) 
Male 0.088 (2.97) 0.085 (2.88) 
No. of Children 0.018 (1.10) 0.018 (1.14) 
Married 0.084 (2.31) 0.090 (2.49) 
HH Size -0.014 (1.53) -0.014 (1.51) 
ir  0.057 (3.23) 0.060 (3.44) 
Year 2004 0.190 (4.68) 0.205 (5.25) 
Year 2001 0.075 (1.68) 0.090 (2.09) 
Year 1998 0.163 (4.00) 0.177 (4.48) 
Year 1995 0.125 (3.04) 0.140 (3.51) 
Log Wealth -0.005 (1.80) -0.005 (1.72) 
Student Work 0.039 (1.53) 0.042 (1.63) 
Chi- Squared 123.44  
p=[0.000] 
121.11 
p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0514 0.0504 
Panel B: Risk Attitudes Dummy Variables 
1=r  0.170 (5.78) 0.173 (5.88) 
2=r  0.110 (3.14) 0.105 (2.97) 
Chi-Squared 139.56  
p=[0.000] 
146.81  
p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0581 0.0611 
Observations 1,740 
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Table 3:  The Determinants of the Probability of Having a Loan for Education and the Size 
of the Educational Loan with ir Male×
 
 and ( 25) ir Age× ≤ Interaction Terms 
 
 Probability of Having a Loan Size of the Loan 
Panel A: Risk Attitudes Index – Male Interaction Term  
 ME tstat ME tstat 
Male 0.159 (3.53) 1.635 (3.58) 
ir  0.093 (3.73) 0.950 (3.81) 
ir Male×  -0.072 (2.05) -0.665 (1.93) 
Chi- Squared 127.64  
p=[0.000] 
145.80 
p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0531 0.0206 
Panel B: Risk Attitudes Dummy Variables – Male Interaction Term 
Male 0.346 (3.01) 1.171 (1.23) 
1=r  0.490 (5.80) 1.936 (2.56) 
2=r  0.390 (3.05) 3.428 (3.73) 
( 1)r Male= ×  0.585 (22.75) 1.210 (1.79) 
( 2)r Male= ×  0.547 (12.35) 2.701 (3.22) 
Chi-Squared 163.37  
p=[0.000] 
176.22 
p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0680 0.0249 
Panel C: Risk Attitudes Index – 25≤Age  Interaction Term 
Age 25≤  0.012 (0.31) 0.090 (0.21) 
ir  0.070 (2.96) 0.719 (3.06) 
( 25)ir Age× ≤  -0.022 (0.64) -0.164 (0.48) 
Chi- Squared 107.15 
 p=[0.000] 
123.77 
p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0446 0.0175 
Panel D: Risk Attitudes Dummy Variables – 25≤Age Interaction Term 
 Age 25≤  0.440 (0.46) 0.163 (0.33) 
1=r  0.525 (5.41) 3.526 (4.81) 
2=r  0303 (2.60) 2.362 (2.71) 
( 1) ( 25)r Age= × ≤   0.482 (12.50) 1.829 (2.31) 
( 2) ( 25)r Age= × ≤  0.456 (9.88) 0.665 (0.46) 
Chi-Squared 128.78 
 p=[0.000] 
143.45 
p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0536 0.0202 
Observations 1,740 
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Table 4: Robustness: Double Hurdle Model 
 
 Participation Intensity 
 Coef. tstat Coef. tstat 
Age 0.513 (2.31) 0.113 (4.34) 
Age Squared -0.001 (2.83) -0.001 (4.15) 
White 1.068 (8.23) 0.975 (4.04) 
Male 0.283 (3.68) 0.342 (3.79) 
N. Kids 0.022 (0.52) -0.112 (2.16) 
Married 0.222 (2.28) 0.080 (0.79) 
HH Size -0.042 (1.67) -0.113 (3.94) 
ir  0.126 (2.73) 0.201 (3.57) 
Year 2004 0.284 (1.94) 1.303 (7.37) 
Year 2001 0.009 (0.06) 1.263 (6.86) 
Year 1998 0.247 (1.70) 1.216 (7.06) 
Year 1995 0.086 (0.61) 0.797 (4.72) 
Log Wealth -0.016 (2.31) 0.038 (4.83) 
Student Work 0.038 (0.55) -0.237 (3.20) 
Turned Down for a Loan 0.188 (2.45) - - 
ρ
 0.437 (2.60) 
L-Likelihood -2181.324 
Panel B: Risk Attitudes Dummy Variables 
1=r  0.399 (5.09) 0.114 (1.11) 
2=r  0.230 (2.49) 0.391 (3.48) 
ρ
 0.475 (3.27) 
L-Likelihood -2169.228 
Observations 1,740 
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Table 5: Robustness: Double Hurdle Model with ir Male×  and ( 25)ir Age× ≤ Interaction 
Terms 
 
 Participation Intensity 
 Coef. tstat Coef. tstat 
Panel A:Risk Attitudes Index – Male Interaction Term  
Male 0.398 (3.40) 0.094 (0.63) 
ir  0.228 (3.61) 0.127 (1.57) 
xMaleri  -0.172 (1.94) 0.186 (1.71) 
Turned Down for a Loan 0.206 (2.76) - - 
ρ
 0.403 (2.68) 
L-Likelihood -2223.132 
Panel B: Risk Attitudes Dummy Variables – Male Interaction Term 
Male 0.125 (0.96) 0.204 (1.21) 
1=r  0.270 (2.60) 0.109 (0.80) 
2=r  0.435 (3.37) 0.303 (1.87) 
( 1)r Male= ×
 
0.363 (2.38) 0.091 (0.47) 
( 2)r Male= ×
 
-0.259 (1.44) 0.282 (1.28) 
ρ
 0.513 (4.20) 
L-Likelihood -2199.671 
Panel C: Risk Attitudes Index – 25≤Age  Interaction Term 
Age 25≤  -0.001 (0.79) -0.002 (1.93) 
ir  0.155 (2.73) 0.050 (0.74) 
( 25)ir Age× ≤  -0.001 (0.30) 0.013 (4.21) 
Turned Down for a Loan 0.227 (3.03) -      - 
ρ
 0.428 (2.04) 
L-Likelihood -2217.814 
Panel D: Risk Attitudes Dummy Variables- 25≤Age Interaction Term 
Age 25≤  -0.002 (0.64) -0.255 (1.63) 
1=r  0.571 (5.81) 0.012 (0.08) 
2=r  0.369 (3.08) 0.422 (2.61) 
( 1) ( 25)r Age= × ≤
 
-0.231 (1.84) 0.388 (2.10) 
( 2) ( 25)r Age= × ≤
 
-0.192 (1.25) 0.174 (0.82) 
ρ
 0.603 (5.85) 
L-Likelihood
 
-2218.411 
Observations
 
1,740 
 
